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MONTANA BINGHAM CONSOLIDATED MINING
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COMPANY
........... .
UNITED STATES SMELTING, REFINING AND
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Plaintiffs and Respondents
vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION and J. LAMBERT GIBSON,
ROSCOE E. HAMMOND, MILTON TWITCHELL and
HEBER BENNION, JR., constituting said Tax Commission.
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
I

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For convenience, and in order to conform with the
plan adopted by Appellants, Respondents will refer herein
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to the Record in Case No. 6869, Combined Metals Reduction
Company v. State Tax Commission, et al.
Appellants' "Statement of the Case" (Brief pp. 2-6) is
inadequate for a clear understanding of the issues and
omits facts which are not only material but, in view of the
applicable statutes, are controlling.
By Chapter 101, Laws of Utah, 1937, (Sections 80-5-65,
et. seq., Utah Code Annotated, 1943), which became effective on May 11, 1937, the Legislature of Utah imposed a
Mine Occupation Tax upon all persons engaged in the
business of mining or producing metalliferous ores, and
the Appellant, State Tax Commission, was empowered to
administer that Act. Thereby, every person engaged in the
business of mining or producing ore containing gold, silver,
copper, lead, iron, zinc or other valuable metals in the
State of Utah was required to pay to the State of Utah,
"an occupation tax equal to one per cent of the gross amount
received for, or the gross value of, metalliferous ore sold,"
during the calendar year then next preceding. Appellants
(Brief, p. 3) refer to the above portion of the Mine Occupation Tax Act, but they apparently deem surplusage or quite
unnecessary to a presentation of their case the provisions
of that statute next below quoted, which provide the method
by which the "gross amount received for, or gross value of,
metalliferous ore sold" shall be determined. Section 80-5-66,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, after providing as above indicated for the payment of an occupation tax equal to one per
cent of the gross amount received for or the gross value
of metalliferous ore sold specifically provides the basis
for computing the occupation tax thereby imposed.
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"THE BASIS FOR COMPUTING THE OCCUPATION TAX IMPOSED BY THIS ACT FOR
ANY YEAR SHALL BE AS FOLLOWS:
" (a) If the ore or metals extracted is sold
under a bona fide contract of sale, the amount of
money or its equivalent actually received by the
owner, lessee, contractor or other person operating
the mine or mining claim from the sale of all ores
or metals during the calendar year less a reasonable
cost, if any, of transporting the ore from the place
where mined to the place where, under the contract
of sale, the ore is to be delivered.
"(b) If the extracted ore is treated at a
mill, smelter or reduction works which receives ores
from independent sources and which is owned or
controlled by the same interest owning or controlling
the mine or mining claim, such disposal shall be
treated as a sale within the meaning of this section
for the purpose of determining gross proceeds or
otherwise, and in such determination a rate or charge
for sampling, assaying, milling and smelting the
ores and extracting the metals and minerals therefrom shall be deducted which shall not exceed an
amount to be determined by applying the same rates
as are applied by such mill, smelter, or reduction
works or competing works, to ores of substantially
like character and in like quantities received from
independent sources. In the event of controversy
the tax commission shall have power to determine
such rates or charges. Transportation charges may
also be deducted as provided in subdivision (a)
hereof.
"(c) If a mill or other reduction works is
operated exclusively in connection with a mine, such
mill or reduction works shall be treated as a part
of the mine and the cost of operating such mill or
reduction works shall, for the purpose of fixing the
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occupation tax imposed by this act, be regarded as
part of the cost of mining and cost of assaying,
sampling, smelting, refining, and transportation,
only, shall be deducted.
"An annual exemption from the payment of
the occupation tax imposed by this act upon $20,000
in gross value of ore shall be allowed to each person,
provided but one exemption shall be allowed for one
claim or group of claims operating under one ownership as a mine."
Only sub paragraphs (a) and (b) supra of Section
80-5-66 are involved here.
It is further provided by the Act (Section 80-5-67,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943) that every person engaged
in the business of mining shall file with the Appellant,
State Tax Commission, a statement setting forth, among
other things, "the total amount received during the preceding calendar year from the sale of ore or metals," and the
amount claimed by way of deduction for treatment charges
and for transportation of the ores or metals sold "from the
place where produced to the place sold."

The sole inquiry here is as to the total amount received
by the several Respondents from the sale of ore and metals
during the calendar year 1943.
The amount actually received by each Respondent during the year 1943 from the sale of its ores and metals is set
out in Column 1, page 31, of the stipulation of facts herein
(Rec. p. 73). Appellants admit that no other or greater
amounts were received from or paid by the purchaser. The
amount of subsidies received by each Respondent during
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that year is set out in Column 2 at the same page and the
gross proceeds assessed by the Appellant commission, which
include subsidy payments received from the Metals Reserve
Company, is set out in Column 3 of the same page of the
record.
By Executive Order of the President No. 8734, promulgated April 11, 1941, as amended by the President's
Executive Order No. 8875, promulgated August 28, 1941,
(Vol. 9, U. S. Cong. Serv. 1941, pp. 852, 867) (R. 37-39)
the President created in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President, an Office
of Price Administration, at the head of which the Presi·dent appointed an Administrator with authority to take all
lawful steps necessary to prevent price spiralling and
inflation, and among other things, to publish and declare
maximum or ceiling prices of materials or commodities,
and to enforce their observance. Pursuant to authority thus
conferred, price schedules for copper were established
August 12, 1941, (Price Schedule No. 15 by the Administrator, Office of Price Administration) (R. 39) and it was
thereby provided, among other things, that no person should
sell or offer to sell, buy or offer to buy, or accept delivery
of copper at prices higher than the maximum of 12c per
pound. And on January 13, 1942, the Administrator issued
Price Schedule No. 69 (R. 42) which by provisions in large
part identical with those of Schedule No. 15, fixed the
maximum price for primary lead at 61;2c per pound; and
on January 28, 1942, the Administrator issued Price Schedule No. 81 (R. 43), which by provisions again in large part
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identical with those of Price Schedule No. 15, fixed the
maximum price for primary slab zinc at 8J.4c per pound.
By Executive Order No. 9024 (Vol. 1 of Accu. Supp.,
Code of Fed. Reg. of the U. S. A., p. 1070) issued January
16, 1942, the President created within the Office for
Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the
President, a War Production Board, and at the head of that
Board appointed a chairman whom he empowered, with
the advice and assistance of the members of the Board,
to exercise general direction of the War Procurement and
Production Program. And the War Production Board and
the Office of Price Administration, by their joint declaration, in the exercise of the powers of the President so conferred upon them, defined copper, lead and zinc as strategic
materials essential to the prosecution of the war.
On January 30, 1942, the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942 became law (ch. 25, 56 Stat. 23; 50 U. S. C. App.
901 to 946, pp. 313 to 349) and its Administrator was
thereby empowered on behalf of the United States in such
manner and upon such terms and conditions as he should
determine to be necessary to obtain the maximum necessary
production of any commodity, to make subsidy payments to
domestic producers of such commodities in such amounts
and in such manner and upon such terms and conditions
as he should determine to be necessary to obtain such
maximum necessary production thereof, provided that in
the case of any commodity which had theretofore been or
might thereafter be defined as strategic or critical by the
President pursuant to Section 5d of the Reconstruction
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Finance Corporation Act (15 U. S. C. A. s. 606b) as
amended, such determination should be made by the Federal
Loan Administrator with the President's approval, and
such subsidy payments to domestic producers might be
made only by corporations created or organized pursuant
to Section 5d. Accordingly, the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation caused to be created as such agency of the
United States a corporation known as Metals Reserve
Company, and that company at all times since has served
in that capacity. And the President of the United States
made his Executive Order No. 9250 as amended by his
Executive Order No. 9381 (50 U. S. C. Appendix, p. 314,
Title V, at p. 316), and pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942 created the Office of Economic Stabilization, and at
the head of that office he established an Economic Stabilization Director, and authorized that Director to direct
Metals Reserve Company to use its authority to subsidize,
were such measure necessary to insure the maximum necessary production of any commodity.
It being found that under the established price ceilings,

costs to be encountered in the production of copper, lead
and zinc and other metals essential to the successful prosecution of the war were too high to insure the maximum
necessary production required for armament and other
purposes of war, and copper, lead and zinc in such maximum necessary production being defined as indispensable
and strategic material for that purpose, and stimulation
of production of those metals being imperative and being
possible by payment of a subsidy for such increased produc-
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tion, the National Government, impelled by the exigencies
of war, paid and pays subsidies for production of these
metals in excess of quotas established jointly by the War
Production Board and the Office of Price Administration.
The subsidies were and are being paid by order of the Office
of Price Administration dated February 9, 1942, No. P. M.
2458, and pursuant to that order, commencing February
1, 1942, Metals Reserve Company has paid a subsidy for
production, over and above fixed quotas of 5c per pound for
copper, 2%c per pound for zinc, and 2%c per pound for lead.
The cases here consolidated for presentation on appeal
were tried before the lower court, as has above been
indicated, upon a stipulation of facts. Among the facts
stipulated to between the parties but omitted from Appellants' "Statement" are the following:
(a) "That none of the ore or metals produced
from any mine of any plaintiff during said calendar
year 1943 was sold by any plaintiff to the United
States Government or to Metals Reserve Company
or to any other agency of the United States Government, but was sold to other purchasers." (R. p. 32.)
(b) "That the sole controversy now remaining
between the parties and the sole matter in issue to
be submitted to and determined by the Court in
each of said pending cases is whether or not, under
the stipulated facts and pertinent statutory and
and constitutional provisions, the payments made to
plaintiff therein by Metals Reserve Company were
a part of the gross amount received for, or the gross
value of metalliferous ore sold and were lawfully
considered and treated as such part in making the
assessment and tax levy complained of." (R. p. 32.)
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(c) Subsidies paid by Metals Reserve Company were not paid upon all ore produced by Respondents but only upon production in excess of
established quotas for the respective mines, (R.
p. 47) and payments varied, certain Respondents
receiving additional premiums where it appeared
that the initial premiums offered for production in
excess of established quotas were not sufficient to
permit of increased production of copper, lead or
zinc and that substantial expenditures were required
for greatly increased development work and rehabilitation of underground workings or additional facilities.
(d) "Metals Reserve Company does not purchase the ores on account of the production of which
it pays premiums to the producer; they are not taken
into account in tariffs filed by railways and approved
by the Interstate Commerce Commission or Public
Service Commission fixing freight rates on ores or
concentrates and predicated primarily on metal
value content; smelting companies may not participate in such premium payments even though their
normal charges be based upon a sliding scale dependent upon the value of the metal content of ores."
(R. p. 61.)
(e) That in certain instances subsidy payments were made by Metals Reserve Company to
the producer in advance of the sale of ores or metals
recovered from the ores, while in other instances
such payments were made after the sale of the ores.
In no instance did it appear that subsidy payments
were or could have been made at the time of the
sale of ores by the producer to the smelters or other
purchaser. (R. pp. 61-62.)
(f) That (R. p. 63) the mining companies
caused to be prepared and submitted to Metals
Reserve Company a memorandum respecting the
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inclusion of premium payments in "net proceeds"
and in "Mine Occupation Tax." After examining
such memorandum a letter was written by the President of Metals Reserve Company to Mr. F. S. Mulock
(General Manager, United States Smelting Refining
and Mining Company). Such memorandum and
letter were upon proper identification, received in
evidence by the Commission, but it was agreed that
the Commission should not be bound by the inferences or conclusions therein stated; in that letter the
President of the Metals Reserve Company said,
"* * *, the statements in the memorandum with
respect to premium payments by Metals Reserve
Company, beginning with the final paragraph on
page 2 and continuing to the end of the memorandum,
are in our opinion, factually true and correct." (R.
64.)
The statements contained in the memorandum
and so referred to as being factually true and correct
are as follows :
"Premium payments made by Metals Reserve
Company are not payments made by that Company
or received by the Mining Company for the sale or
conversion into money or its equivalent of any ores:
"Such premium payments are not realized from
a sale; they are not paid by a purchaser (Metals
Reserve Company does not purchase the ores upon
account of which it makes premium payments) ;
they are not paid at the time of a sale, nor are they
based upon recoverable metals or actual recoveries
at any particular concentrator or smelter, nor upon
the terms of private settlement contracts; they are
specifically exempted from the Excess Profits Tax;
they are not taken into account in tariffs filed by
railways and approved by the Interstate Commerce
Commission or Public Service Commission fixing
freight rates on ores or concentrates and predicated

11
primarily on metal value content; smelters may not
participate in such payments even though their
normal charges be based upon a sliding scale dependent upon value of metal contents.
"The announced purpose of premium payments
was 'to expand output of copper, lead and zinc because of their importance in the production of armaments', '* * * to compensate operators for extra
costs involved for bringing out additional metal
output,' '* * * to make it possible quickly to increase production by mining low grade sub-marginal
ores and to develop additional ore reserves.' (See
OPA Release, February 9, 1942.)
"Such purpose is emphasized by the order freezing royalties and prohibiting diversion of any part
of "B" and "C" quotas,-it being said that diversion
of such added premiums into increased royalties to
landowners would be 'an unwarranted expenditure
of public funds which can contribute nothing to
further production.'
"To the extent that any portion of such premiums are taken by a state on account of a property
tax, the purpose of Metals Reserve Company in
paying the same would be defeated and such funds
be diverted from the use in the production of ores
to a contribution to the support of state or local
government.'' (R. pp. 66-67.)

II

ARGUMENT
1.

The Subsidy or Premium Payments Received by
Respondents From Metals Reserve Company were No
Part of the "Gross Amount Received For, Or Gross
Value of Metalliferous Ore Sold.''
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Obviously the power to levy an occupation tax can only
be exercised pursuant to an Act of the Legislature clearly
prescribing the tax and a yardstick for determining its
amount. If the yardstick employed is unsuitable, unfair
or otherwise imperfect, the fault lies with the Legislature
and cannot be corrected by the executive or judicial departments. A fairly wide discretion in selecting the yardstick
is vested in the Legislature. In various states the occupation
tax is determined from "Income," "Volume of Business
Done," "Gross Earnings," "Gross Sales," etc. Occasionally
the selected yardstick has been rejected by the courts as
inappropriate. In such case the sole remedy has been and
is a new and lawful statute supplied by the Legislature and
not by a taxing agency of the executive department.
At the top of page 3 of their brief, appellants correctly
quote a portion of Section 80.. 5-66, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, wherein it is provided that the occupation tax levied
shall be "equal to one per cent of the gross amount received
for, or the gross value of, metalliferous ore sold" during
the calendar year then next preceding.
Even if the quoted excerpt contained all of the provisions of the section relating to the prescribed yardstick
or pertinent to the question here presented for decision,
it seems to us perfectly clear that the judgment of the trial
court must be affirmed. Throughout Appellants' arguments the significance of the word "sold" appearing in the
quoted excerpt, is ignored. Were it assumed as contended
by Appellants that the yardstick should have been "Income"
or "Gross Proceeds" or "Gross Receipts" from any source,
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the inescapable fact remains that the legislative department
decreed otherwise in the quoted excerpt, even without the
aid of the unquoted provisions of the section, which the
Appellants have entirely disregarded.
When the Legislature says in the quoted excerpt that
the tax shall be "equal to one per cent of the gross amount
received for, or the gross value of, metalliferous ore sold"
it seems to us unmistakable that the levy must either be "one
per cent of the gross amount received" under a bona fide
contract for the "metalliferous ore sold" or "one per cent
of the gross value of metalliferous ore sold." But were
there any possible ambiguity in the quoted excerpt as to the
yardstick to be applied the ambiguity is conclusively dispelled by the portion of the section which appellants failed
to quote but which we quote in our statement of facts and
here repeat for convenience.
"The basis for computing the occupation tax
imposed by this act for any year shall be as follows:
(a) If the ore or metals extracted is sold
under a bona fide contract of sale the amount of
money or its equivalent actually received by the
owner, lessee, contractor or other person operating
the mine or mining claim from the sale of all ores
or metals during the calendar year less a reasonable
cost, if any, of transporting the ore from the place
where mined to the place where, under the contract
of sale, the ore is to be delivered.
(b) If the extracted ore is treated at a mill,
smelter or reduction works which receives ores from
independent sources and which is owned or controlled by the same interests owning or controlling
the mine or mining claim, such disposal shall be
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treated as a sale within the meaning of this section
for the purpose of determining gross proceeds or
otherwise, and in such determination a rate or charge
for sampling, assaying, milling and smelting the
ores and extracting the metals and minerals therefrom shall be deducted which shall not exceed an
amount to be determined by applying the same rates
as are applied by such mill, smelter, or reduction
works or competing works, to ores of substantially
like character and in like quantities received from
independent sources."
There is no contention here that sales of ore were made
other than bona fide and no contention that any erroneous
computation was made with respect to the sale of the ores
the determination of the value of which is covered by subdivisions (a) and (b) of the statute above quoted.
There is nothing unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful in the express mandate of the Legislature prescribing
the basis for computing the occupation tax which is to be
paid. The prescribed methods of computing the tax are not
given in the statute by way of example but are exclusive and
conclusive.
In view of the fact that it is here stipulated that "Metals
Reserve Company does not purchase the ores on account
of the production of which it pays premiums to the producer" it is not only difficult but impossible to understand
how the premium or subsidy payments could be properly
included in "the amount of money or its equivalent actually
received

* * *"

* * *

from the sale of

* * *

ore or metals
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In an effort seemingly to bring the subsidy payments
within the purview of the mining occupation tax statute,
Appellants imply that the subsidy payments made by
Metals Reserve Company were made as, and were, part of
the purchase price for which the metals were sold. The
trouble with that contention is that it has no basis in fact.
Metals Reserve Company made the subsidy payments, but
it neither bought the ores nor did it have a contract to buy
them, nor did it acquire any interest in the ores or metals
sold. It did not pay any part of the purchase price of the
ores or metals sold. The consideration for the sale of the
ores and metals was paid by the purchasers and no one else,
and was paid at or about the time of sale which bore no
relation whatever to the payment of the subsidies. Subsidy
payments were received by the smelters as agents for the
Metals Reserve Company and were distributed to the producer, sometimes before and sometimes after the purchase
of the ores and payment therefor, but never contemporaneously therewith, and in many cases not by the same smelter
that purchased all of the producer's ores.
The ceiling prices constitute the sole consideration paid
by the purchasers for all ores or metal sold, and the producers are denied by law the right to sell or offer to sell
buy, or offer to buy, or to accept, delivery of copper, lead
or zinc at prices higher than the stated maximums of 12c
per pound for copper, 6.5c per pound for lead and 8.25c per
pound for zinc. (Executive Order No. 8734 as amended by
Executive Order No. 8875 Vol. 9. U. S. Cong. Serv. 1941,
pp. 852,867; Rec. pp. 39, 40, 42 and 43.)
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While railroad freight rates are based on the value of
ore shipped it is stipulated herein (R. p. 61) that subsidy
payments are never included in determination of the value
upon which the freight rates are based; nor may smelting
companies participate in such premium payments even
though their charges are based upon a sliding scale dependent upon the metal value of the ores (R. 61).
There is a fundamental distinction between proceeds
realized from a sale of ore and a subsidy paid by the
Government for over-quota production. The difference is
not of degree but of character and purpose. Bouvier defines
a sale as "an agreement by which one of two contracting
parties, called the seller, gives the thing and passes the title
to it, in exchange for a certain price in current money, to
the other party, who is called the buyer or purchaser, who,
on his part, agrees to pay such price."
We have substantially the same definition in Title 81,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, which deals with "Sales."
There must be a seller and a buyer. The buyer is the one
who receives the goods and is bound to pay the price.
Subsidies or bounties have nothing to do with the value
of the goods produced or the services performed. They are
given purely and simply for the promotion of the public
welfare.
The bounty paid for the killing of a wolf or a coyote
has nothing to do with the market price of the hide. The
value of the article produced and the bounty paid for its
production are two separate and distinct things. So in this
case the subsidy or bounty paid by the government is paid
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without regard to the intrinsic value of the metals. It is
paid because the exigencies of war demand it, that there
may be brought into existence in sufficient quantities metals
that are critically essential to the prosecution of the war.
Different operators not only have been assigned different quotas on the same metals, thus establishing a variety
of bases upon which the subsidies are paid, but the subsidies themselves vary in amount, being A or A and B or
A, B and C subsidies according to the circumstances peculiar
to each producer. Thus were the subsidy payments to be
included as a part of the receipts from sales or as a part
of the value of the ores or metals sold, there would be almost
as many sales prices or values for the same metals sold as
there would be producers. An utter lack of uniformity or
equality would prevail, for though two operators produce
identical quantities of the same metal, sell it on the open
market for an identical sum, one, because of the difference
in quotas, or the class of subsidies assigned, or both, would
be called upon to pay a tax and the other not, or the rate
of taxation would differ between them, although the product sold were identical, an incongruous situation to result
from application of a fiction not within contemplation of
the mining occupation tax of Utah.
To permit the construction contended for by appellants the mandate of the Utah statute that the occupation
tax levied shall be "equal to one per cent of the gross
amount received for, or the gross value of, metalliferous ore
sold" must be supplemented so that the required levy shall
be "equal to one per cent of the gross amount received for,
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or the gross value of, metalliferous ore sold, plus one per
cent of any subsidies paid by the United States Government
for producing metals vital to the war effort in excess of
a fixed quota." The fact that when the statute was enacted
there were no quotas, no subsidy payments, and not even
a war does not seem to trouble appellants in arriving at
their conclusion that the Legislature clearly read the future
and had especially in mind the levy of an occupation tax
on any rewards for extra effort that might be offered by the
Government during times of national peril.
It must always be kept in mind that the tax here in

question is an occupation tax-not an income tax. Each
respondent has already made full payment of its income tax.
In arriving at the amount of such tax all subsidy payments
received by any respondent were properly included as a part
of its income.
In the suits at bar it would appear unnecessary to call
attention to the elementary principle stated in United States
v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179,44 S.C. 69,68 L. Ed. 240, that:
"-in statutes levying taxes the literal meaning
of the words employed is most important, for such
statutes are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. If the
words are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved
against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.--"

Miller v. Standard Nut Ma,rgarine Co., 284 U.
S. 498, 52 S. C. 260, 76 L. Ed. 422;
Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 38 S. C. 53, 62
L. Ed. 211.
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The Supreme Court of Utah enunciated the same principle with equal clarity in Norville v. State Tax Commission,
98 Utah 170, 97 P. (2d) 937, 126 A. L. R. 1318, as follows:
"-in seeking to give effect to the intent of the
legislature the court will adopt that interpretation
of a taxing statute which lays the tax burden uniformly on all standing in the same degree with relation to the tax adopted. --And will avoid an interpretation which would lead to an impractical, unfair, or unreasonable result. - - "
The doctrine that taxing statutes are, in case of doubt
as to the intention of the legislature, to be construed
strictly against the taxing authority and in favor of those
on whom the tax is levied, has been well set out in the
case of Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.
S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 50, 79 L. Ed. 211. See, also, Los Angeles
& S. L. R. Co. v. Richards, 52 Utah 1, 172 P. 474;
W. F. Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Commission, 90 Utah
359, 61 P. 2d 629, 107 A. L. R. 261; 25 R. C. L. Sec. 307
at p. 1092; Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 11, 4th Ed. Sec. 503
at p. 1113.
Under the statutes and authorities and on every basis
of reason and logic, it is submitted that the subsidies are
bonuses paid by the United States as a bounty to encourage
production of copper, lead and zinc, and may not be considered as a part of the gross amount received for, or the
gross value of, ores sold.
Appellants in their brief have erroneously made certain statements to which we wish here to call attention.
At the bottom of page 8, it is stated that the producer
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would receive the ceiling price for their ores from the
smelters to which they were shipped and at the same time
would receive from Metals Reserve Company from the very
same smelter the premium payments for their ores produced
in excess of his quota. As stipulated, such payments were
not made at the same time and frequently not by the same
smelter. Where a producer shipped all ores to one smelter,
premium payments were made through that smelter, but
where a producer shipped to more than one smelter he
selected the smelter through which he would receive premium payments.
At page 10, under paragraph numbered 9, it is stated
that in order to relieve the mining companies from the provisions of the ceiling price schedules, the Office of Price Administration issued its supplementary regulation No. 4, exempting from such ceiling prices, sales or deliveries of copper, lead or zinc to Metals Reserve Company or to its duly
authorized agent or agents, pursuant to the premium price
plan. It is not clear whether Appellants intend to suggest
that this order permitted smelting companies individually
purchasing copper, lead or zinc to pay more than the ceiling
price for such metals because they had been designated by
Metals Reserve Company as its agents for certain purposes
but not for the purpose of purchasing such ores or whether
this statement is made for some other purpose. In any
event it has been stipulated as herein shown that the ores
were sold at the ceiling prices, were sold to the smelters
and that the subsidy payments came from the Metals Reserve Company which did not purchase the ores.
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At page 20 it is stated that the smelters are made the
agents of the Federal Government for the purpose of receiving the ores and paying the premium prices and that
the producers are required to dispose of the ores at the
designated smelters before the premium prices will be paid.
The smelters are not designated as agents for the purpose
of receiving ores and the producers were not required to
dispose of their ores to any designated smelters. The producer selects the smelters to which he wishes to ship and
when he ships to more than one smelter designates through
which smelter he will receive premiums from Metals Reserve Company. The purpose of this requirement by Metals
Reserve Company was obviously to avoid the possibility
of duplication in premium payments.
At pages 12, 28, 29 and elsewhere in their brief Appellants state that it was held by the trial court and that it
has been urged by Respondents that the subsidy payments
were mere gifts. The court made no such statement, nor
is it anywhere urged by Respondents. This statement is
apparently made by Appellants for the purpose of tying
their argument to certain income tax cases cited by them
in which it has been held that receipts claimed by taxpayers
to be gifts were nevertheless income under the income tax
statutes. Those cases are irrelevant here since we are
not concerned with income but with an occupation tax the
basis of computing which is specifically provided for in the
Act which creates the tax.
The case of Vause etc. v. McKibbin, 39 N. E. (2d) 1006
referred to by Appellants at pages 13 to 16 of their brief
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is irrelevant. That case involved a retail sales tax based
upon "Gross Receipts" and it was held that the retailer
must pay his tax upon $1.03 where he priced the article at
$1.00 but received in payment therefor $1.03, the additional
3c being designated, as between the retailer and consumer,
a payment of tax. Our court in the case of Dupler Art Furs
v. State Ta.x Commission,-- Utah--, 161 P. (2d) 788,
has just held the opposite under our sales tax act which
defines purchase price as the price to the consumer, exclusive of tax. In that case Judge Larson said "I concur
in the holding that the term 'purchase price' upon which
our state sales tax is computed, is the price the purchaser
pays not including the said luxury tax. In other words the
Federal luxury tax is excluded from the purchase price
in computing the state sales tax."
The Minnesota case of State v. Armson, --Minn.-207 N. W. 732, relied on by Appellants, involved an occupation tax statute where the purchaser paid in advance of
delivery and took a discount. The Court held that the discount represented interest on money paid before it was
due rather than an allowance on the purchase price.
The cases of Me1·cur Gold Mining Company v. Spry,
16 Utah 222, 52 Pac. 352 and Salt Lake County v. Utah
Copper Company, 294 Fed. 199, cited at page 17 of Appellants' brief did not involve the statute or the problem presented here and are irrelevant, and as stated, supra, if our
statute used the words "gross income," "gross earnings" or
other phrases such as those relied upon by Appellants but
different from those actually used, or if an income tax prob-
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lem was involved, the other cases relied upon by Appellants
might be enlightening.
The only case in which the problem here presented has
come before a court of last resort in any state is the case
of Klies v. Linnane (Mont.) decided February 26, 1945,
and reported at 156 P. (2d) 183 wherein the Montana
Supreme Court held that subsidies identical with those here
involved were not properly to be included in the "gross
value" of the miner's product to arrive at the valuation of
net proceeds of mines for the purpose of taxation, saying,
(156 P. (2d) 185) :
"(1) It is, therefore, clear that in the determination of the 'valuation of the net proceeds of such
mines and mining claims for the purpose of taxation,'
S. 2091, Revised Codes, the gross value of the product, which is the basis for computation, is the
money which the producer received or should properly have received upon the bona fide sale of his
product. The question here is whether the premium
or bonus received from the government, which was
not the purchaser of the ores or metals, should be
considered as constituting a part of the gross value,
or of the proceeds of bona fide sale, of plaintiff's
products.
"Title 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix S 902 (e), which
is a part of the Emergency Price Control Act, provides: 'Whenever the Administrator determines that
the maximum necessary production of any commodity is not being obtained or may not be obtained
during the ensuing year, he may, on behalf of the
United States, * * * make subsidy payments to
domestic producers of such commodity in such
amounts and in such manner and upon such terms
and conditions as he determines to be necessary to
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obtain the maximum necessary production thereof:
Provided, That in the case of any commodity which
has heretofore or may hereafter be defined as a
strategic or critical material by the President pursuant to section 5d of the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation Act (section 609j of Title 15) as
amended, such determinations shall be made by the
Federal Loan Administrator, with the approval of
the President, and notwithstanding any other provision of this Act (sections 901-946 of this Appendix) or of any existing law * * * such subsidy
payments to domestic producers thereof may be paid,
only by corporations created or organized pursuant
to such section 5d (section 609j of Title 15) ; * * *"
"(2) The Metals Reserve Company was created
for the purposes mentioned in those federal acts.
It encourages the increased production of strategic
metals, including lead and zinc, by paying the producer a premium or bonus for such production in
excess of a quota fixed by it for that producer. In
this connection two points should be noted. The
Metals Reserve Company does not thereby increase
the price of the metal, or the amount to be paid by
the purchaser for the ·metal ; nor does it pay the
premium or bonus upon all the production, but only
upon the production in excess of the defined quota.
Thus, as intended by the federal statute, it is not
production, but increased production, which is encouraged.
"Webster's New International Dictionary defines 'bonus' as a 'subsidy to an industry from a
government.' It defines 'sudsidy' as a 'grant of funds
or property from a government, * * * to a private
person or company to assist in the establishment or
support of an enterprise deemed advantageous to
the public.' It is an artificial way of encouraging an
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industry or enterprise otherwise than by increasing
the value of its product.
"It is apparent that under natural economic
laws the production of lead and zinc ores, as well
as of other products, automatically results whenever economically practicable, and that it cannot
ordinarily result unless so. Production not otherwise
practicable may artificially be made so, either by
increasing the price of the product, or by rewarding
the production otherwise, as by subsidy or bonus
payment. An essential difference between the two
methods is that a direct price increase ordinarily
not only rewards and thus encourages additional
production, but also makes more profitable the production which would have existed without it; on the
other hand, the subsidy or bonus method can more
practicably be limited in application to the additional
production. Either method would tend to increase
the production of strategic metals for war purposes
by making profitable an enterprise which otherwise
could not pay its way, and, therefore, could not
operate. Both methods increase the proceeds, and
therefore the value of the enterprise by making it
profitable, but only the price rise method increases
the value of the product. Thus they are similar only
in increasing the income from, and the value of
the enterprise.

"(3) Defendant argues in his brief that 'although the premium or bonus is paid as an inducement to increase production of strategic metals, its
effect is to increase the value of such metals to plaintiffs.' But its effect is not to increase the value of
the metals to plaintiffs or anyone else, for it does
not change the prices at which they are bought and
sold. Defendant fails to distinguish between the
enterprise, the profits and value of which are increased by the bonus or subsidy, and the product
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itself, the value of which is not thus increased. The
killing of bear for bearskins and the production of
beets for sugar may not be profitable enterprises.
They may be made profitable by a bounty on the
killing of bear or the raising of beets, but it cannot
be said that such bounty increases the value of the
bearskins or the sugar. It is the enterprise, not the
product, which has been increased in value. But
the tax upon the net proceeds of mines is not based
upon the value of the enterprise, nor upon all possible
income therefrom. It is based only upon the net
value of the ores produced. Income in addition to
that received as the net value of the product may
perhaps be taxable as income, but it is clearly not
taxable as 'net proceeds of mines' which the statute
identifies as the net value of the product and bases
upon the gross proceeds of its bona fide sale.
"Webster's New International Dictionary defines 'value' as a 'fair return in money, goods,
services, etc., for something exchanged; that which
is considered an equivalent in worth; * * * monetary worth of a thing, marketable price; also, worth
as estimated in terms of a currency or of another
medium of exchange.'
"A further examination of the premium or
bonus system employed demonstrates the fallacy of
defendant's argument that it is the value of the
product which is increased. The Metals Reserve
Company has instituted a double premium for zinc
production. Under it the normal quota may reflect
a normal price of 11c per pound. A certain excess
production may receive a bonus of 2%c per pound,
while still further excess production may receive
an additional bonus of that amount. Thus the zinc
production of a certain mine, all of which is sold
on the market at its value of approximately llc per
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pound, may under the quota system be additionally
rewarded by a bonus of 23,4c per pound upon part of
the excess and by a bonus of 5%c per pound upon
the remainder. But can it be said that this zinc, all
of it precisely the same, varies in value so that some
of it is worth llc, some 133/l,c, and some 161f2c per
pound? Obviously, the increase, is not in the value
of the product but in the income, profitableness and
value of the enterprise, upon which the tax in question is not based. The additional income is from a
collateral or additional source, not included in the
tax base.
"Defendant argues further that the premium
or bonus plan is part of the emergency price control
system, that the effect of that system is to prevent
the ascertainment of value in a free market, and
that the bonus, together with the sale price, should
therefore be considered as the equivalent of that
value. But, as noted above, the value, however fixed,
is the price paid and received for the metal, and
other reward, incentives or incidental income are
not part of that value; they are therefore not part
of the tax base.
"Defendant cites section 1996, subdivision 5,
which defines both 'value' and 'full cash value' as
meaning for taxation purposes 'the amount at which
the property would be taken in payment of a just
debt due from a solvent debtor,' and asks: 'Would
anybody seriously assert that if plaintiffs in this
case had owed a creditor $217,876.68 that creditor
would not have been eager and willing to take plaintiffs' total production of metals, including zinc and
lead, for what they could be sold for in the market
plus the bonus which the Metals Reserve Company
was willing to pay as a bonus or premium for producing them?' The question must be answered con-
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trary to defendants' apparent view for the Metals
Reserve Company would not pay the bonus to the
creditor or other purchaser, but only to the producer.

"It is apparent, therefore, that the premium or
bonus paid by the government, not as part of a purchase price for the product, but as an inducement
for its production, is not a part of the value of the
product."
Appellants in their brief on page 36 attempt very
briefly to distinguish the Montana statutes involved in the
case of Klies v. Linnane, and then divert to refer to a Montana Occupation tax statute which wasn't involved in that
case.
As a matter of fact the Montana statutes involved in
the Klies case were conceivably susceptible of the interpretation which Appellants are asking the Court to place
on our occupation tax statute, for although the language
of the Montana provisions was properly construed in the
Klies case as meaning what is espressly stated in the pertinent provisions of the Utah statute, the language there
employed might by some stretch of the imagination make
plausible a contention that subsidy payments were there
intended to be included and treated as a part of the net
annual proceeds of Montana mines. Under Sections 2089
and 2090 of the Montana Code, the mine owner is required
to report "the gross yield" from his mine, and "the gross
yield or value in dollars and cents" less specified deductions
determines the assessment upon which the tax levy must
rest. Unlike the Utah statute, the assessment is not expressly and unmistakably based upon and tied to the "gross
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amount received for or the gross value of metalliferous ore
sold." The Montana statute, unlike the Utah statute, does
not expressly say that the "gross yield" of minerals produced shall be confined to "the gross amount received for
or the gross value of metalliferous ore sold" and does not
thus expressly exclude any "yield" or income derived from
other sources than a "sale." In holding that the Montana
statutes necessarily imply what the Utah statutes expressly
provide, the Supreme Court of that State merely adopted
a commonsense construction of what must have been intended by the Montana Legislature. The Utah statutes
leave no possible room for a contention like that unsuccessfully urged by the Montana County Treasurer.
With reference to Appellants' argument that the value
of the product was increased because of subsidy payments,
the decision of the Montana Court as above set out is
pertinent. Moreover the ancient law of supply and demand
still operates. Under that law the "value" of bear skins,
metals, or of any o'ther property cannot be increased by
increasing the supply. The rule holds good in times of
depression, in war or in peace. The announced purpose
and the achieved purpose of the subsidy program was to
increase 'the supply of metals vital to the war. What might
have been the sale price or value of the metals in the
absence of a ceiling price is problematical. What was the
value and the top sale price of the metals involves no
possible uncertainty. Under the stipulated facts and pursuant to valid contracts of sale, each Respondent sold its
metals at the top price.
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The weakness of a contention that subsidy payments
had any relationship to value is apparent from the fact
that a pound of lead, copper or zinc produced by a Respondent before it had exceeded its quota and another pound
of the same metal produced after it had exceeded its quota
would be identical in weight, kind and character and on any
market would necessarily sell for the same price and be of
identical value.
At page 29 of their brief Appellants accurately state
with reference to the nature of the subsidies:
"The quid pro quo for which such premium payments
were made, was the actual production of the various
metals * * *."
The concluding part of the sentence that said production
was "for the Federal Government in the prosecution of the
war" may be true in part. Although the record is silent
as to the ultimate consumer of any products sold by any
Respondent, that consumer may in some instances have been
a government agency. But regardless of who may have
received all or any part of any ore or metals sold, appellants
necessarily deny their contention that the premium payments were a part "of the gross amount received for or the
gross value of the metalliferous ore sold" when they say
on page 29 of their brief, as to the nature of these payments:
"The premium payments were made for production
of ore * * *."
If and when the Government or one of its agencies
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received and used for the war effort a quantity of metal
produced by a Respondent on a portion of which premium
payments had been made and on the remainder of which
no premium payment had been made because Respondent
has not then exceeded his quota, pursuant to what definition
of value and by what process of reasoning would anyone
say that a pound of metal for the production of which no
premium had been paid had a different or a less value than
an identical pound of the same metai produced after
Respondent had exceeded its quota?
2.

The Exaction of the Tax Herein Complained of was a
Direct and Unconstitutional Interference with and
Burden upon the Functions of the National Government.

In view of the statute and the stipulated facts, we
see no occasion to impose upon the time of the court with
a detailed discussion of constitutional questions; nevertheless to permit the state to take under the occupation tax
any part of the premium payments made by Metals Reserve
Company would constitute a direct and unlawful burden
upon the National Government. As indicated above the
chairman of Metals Reserve Company approved the statement that "To the extent that any portion of such premiums
are taken by a state on account of a property tax the purpose of Metals Reserve Company in paying the same would
be defeated and such funds be diverted from use in the
production of ores to a contribution to the support of state
or local government."
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"A state cannot interfere with the free and unembarassed exercise by the Federal government of all power
conferred upon it." 51 Am. Juris., Taxation, Sec. 218, p.
279; 11 Am. Juris., p. 870, Constitutional Law, Section 174.
"It necessarily follows that a state and the subordinate

taxing units thereof are without power to subject to taxation the property of the Federal government or the means,
instrumentalities and agencies thereof which it employs
to carry out its proper functions, unless Congress expressly
confers a right upon the states to tax such agencies, instrumentalities or property." 51 Am. Juris., p. 279, Taxation, Sec. 218.
"The state may not burden or interfere with the
exercise of national power or make it a source of revenue,
or tax things sold, or tax the means used, for the performance of federal functions." 51 Am. Juris., p. 279, Taxation, Sec. 218.
The tax is neither indirect nor remote. It is a reduction
by the state of the special allowances Congress has directed
to be paid to successfully conduct a war.
The doctrine upon this subject originates from the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
McCulloch v. State of Maryland, et al., 17 U. S. 159, 4
Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. Chief Justice Marshall in the
opinion said :
"The sovereignty of a state extends to everything
which exists by its own authority, or is introduced
by its permission; but does it extend to those mean.~
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which are employed by congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people
of the United States?"
Appellants rely upon such cases as:

.James V. Dravo Contra.cting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 82
L. Ed. 155; and Alabama v. King and Boozer,
314 U. S. 1, 86 L. Ed. 3,
which were efforts to tax private property of an individual
as salary, contractor's profits, or the like. But this is not
such a case.

The effort here is actually to take away

a part of these special allowances paid by the National
Government to further the prosecution of the war. The
tax involved in the suit at bar falls directly and immediately upon an operation of the National Government, and
upon the very means employed by the National Government
for the exercise of its powers.
As stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 55; 41 S. Ct. 16; 65 L. Ed. 126, 128:
"With regard to taxation, no matter how reasonable, or how universal and undiscriminating, the
state's inability to interfere has been regarded as
established since M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
316, 4 L. Ed. 579. The decision in that case was not
put upon any consideration of degree, but upon the
entire absence of power on the part of the states to
touch, in that way, at least, the instrumentalities of
the United States ( 4 Wheat. 429, 430), and that is
the law today."
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III
CONCLUSION
The application of Section 80-5-66 Utah Code Annotated 1943, to the facts stipulated herein clearly makes
the consideration of other contentions or arguments unnecessary. That statute not only levies the tax but definitely
and precisely prescribes the yardstick by which the amount
of the tax is to be measured.
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed.
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